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Hi. A little intro, and a question.
I'm the guy posted the pointer to your article on the Yahoo analytic-borders group, that you replied to on the usenet fa.analytic-philosophy echo. I'm a big fan of Ed Zalta's SEP. I'm a CS guy, been working on a sort of philosophy of computation project for some years now, hope to publish "soon". Have read some philosophy of biology, Mayr, Dennett, Nagel, Sober, et al, Millikan, Fodor, Chomsky, more philosophy of science, my own concerns are some kind of neo-analyticity and computationalism, which I think is well-informed by studying biology. Actually, I think biology may be well-informed by studying computation, too.
Anyway, here's a little question. I see in your article you say, "Although only a few reductionists demand explanation to be strictly nomological ...". Well, Fodor has addressed this many times, and I recall, but cannot find, a phrase he used (I think), "non-strict reduction", for the kind of not-exactly nomological reduction that allows for multiple-realization of intelligence as AI, for example, Fodor's major concern having been computational theories of mind. If anybody can give me the reference to where he used the term "non-strict reduction", I'd be very grateful!
Thanks.
BTW, I think it's great for you to host a discussion forum attached to the SEP article. Don't know what kind of traffic you'll get, but it seems a good feature to have.
Josh
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